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Abstract 
In Albania, remittance has been an important factor for the country’s economic growth since the 
collapse of the country’s communist regime in the early 1990s. In this paper, I investigated why migrants 
send remittance to their parents household. In the analysis, I considered four remittance motivations: 
altruistic, exchange, insurance, and inheritance motivations. To control sample selection of migration, I 
apply the Heckman sample selection model.  The results suggest that migrants in Albania are driven to 
remit owing to a combination of altruistic, exchange, and inheritance motivations. Further, migration 
destination influences remittance amount, which implies that not only the local labor market and 
exchange rate at the final destination but also migration motivation factors affect remittance amount. 
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1. Introduction 
A large number of migrants, mainly motivated by economic factors, have left 
Albania over recent decades. After the collapse of the country’s communist regime in 
the early 1990s, Albanians suffered poor economic outcomes (e.g., high poverty and 
high unemployment), and thus, the number of international migrants rapidly expanded, 
especially to nearby countries such as Greece and Italy. In line with this trend, migrants 
are increasingly sending remittances to their families in their home countries in order to 
soften their economic difficulties. Migrant remittance has thus risen year by year; in 
2009, total remittances exceeded $1.3 billion, twice the total value of Albania’s exports, 
seven times its inward ODA, and five times its inward FDI (World Bank 2010). 
Although income shocks (e.g., unemployment, ceremonial occasions, and 
natural disasters) can be often unavoidable, in a poor credit market environment such as 
that commonly found in developing countries, it is difficult to overcome such shocks 
through formal financial institutions. In such an environment, intra-household income 
transfer thus serves as a potential channel to smoothen consumption (Rosenzweig and 
Stark 1989). Previous studies have found that remittances sent to developing countries 
allow households not only to meet their daily expenses, but also to invest in human 
capital such as education and health (Gobel 2013; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010). 
Therefore, these studies imply that remittance has the potential to contribute to 
long-term economic growth by investing in human capital as well as reducing poverty. 
Development economists have previously attempted to explain the motivations 
behind migrant remittance. For example, Cox et al. (1998) investigate altruistic 
 2 
motivation and exchange motivation using household survey data in Peru. In the same 
vein, de la Briere et al. (2002) find that migration destination is related to remittance 
motivation in the Dominican Republic. They show that while adult female migrants in 
the US are driven to remit because of insurance motivations, other migrants remit in 
order to receive inheritance from their parents. Based on the foregoing, the present 
study examines in more depth the underlying reasons why individuals remit to their 
families in their home countries. In particular, I investigate four of the main motivations 
behind migrant remittance comprehensively: altruistic motivation, exchange motivation, 
insurance motivation, and inheritance motivation. 
Although previous studies have argued that migration is not random sample of 
the population (Stark and Lucus 1988; Hoddinott 1994), their estimations of the 
determinants of remittance have ignored the selection mechanism of migration. If this 
selection mechanism affects the determinants of remittance amount, an OLS estimation 
of these determinants should be biased1. Therefore, in order to avoid biased estimators, 
this study applies the Heckman selection model for the estimation. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
pattern of migration and remittance in Albania. Section 3 explains the four main 
motivations behind migrant remittance. Section 4 discusses the empirical methods, 
while Section 5 presents the dataset used and summarizes the statistics. Section 6 
                                            
1 Other studies adopt a type one Tobit model in order to estimate the determinants of remittance. 
However, such models (sometimes incorrectly) assume the covariates affect decision-making 
regarding whether individuals remit to parents and the remittance amount in an identical manner. 
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discusses the results and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Migrant Remittance in Albania 
2.1. Migration in Albania 
The communist regime that ruled Albania from the end of World War II until 
1990 prohibited migration. Given that living standards in Albania were the worst of all 
Eastern European countries at the fall of the regime, individuals and families soon 
began to migrate to urban areas or nearby countries to improve their lives. Consequently, 
internal and international migration increased at an explosive pace. The stabilization of 
the political and economic situation in 1992 steadied the flow of migration. However, in 
1996, when the country’s formal pyramid savings schemes (so-called Ponzi schemes 
with savings amounting to over half of the GDP for 1996) collapsed, the political 
system fell into turmoil and the flow of international migration was re-ignited. Only as 
the economy gradually recovered from 1998 to 2002 did the outflow of migration 
restabilize (Carletto et al. 2004). 
In Albania, migration is a household strategy for overcoming economic 
difficulties (e.g., poverty, unemployment) (Azzarri and Carletto 2009). The main 
international destinations for migrants are neighboring countries such as Greece and 
Italy (Chaloff 2008), although Albanians also emigrate to other destinations such as the 
US, England, Australia, Canada, Turkey, France, and Macedonia (World Bank 2010). 
Migrants are likely to remit to their families in their home countries. From a macro 
standpoint, international remittances increased rapidly since the fall of communism in 
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1992 to 2007, but since 2008, the amount has decreased because of the global financial 
crisis (Figure 12). Nevertheless, in 2009, total remittances still exceeded $1.3 billion 
(World Bank 2010). This substantial figure implies that remittance is an important 
source of foreign currency earnings in Albania. 
The Albanian government supports the flow of out migrants through its National 
Strategy on Migration, which was proposed by the International Organization for 
Migration. The main objective of this policy is to enhance the link between migration 
and the development of Albania by directing remittances to invest into business 
activities (Chaloff 2008). In this regard, the government supports Albanian migrants by 
improving their treatment in their final destinations (e.g., improving their image and 
protecting the rights of Albanian migrants). The government also intervene the 
migration process (e.g., access to information on emigration possibilities, registration of 
migrants, and visa policy). 
2.2. The characteristics of migrants 
In this study, a migrant is defined as a child living away from home. As of 2010, 
the stock of migrants in Albania was 1,438,300, which corresponded to 45.4% of the 
national population (World Bank 2010). Table 1 presents the demographic 
characteristics of the migrants sampled in this study by destination. The dataset used in 
this study includes 20,015 individuals; of these, 15,816 of them have not migrated 
(non-migrants), 2370 have migrated internally, 712 have migrated to Greece, 763 have 
migrated to Italy, and 354 have migrated to other countries. Although there are no major 
                                            
2 Data source: World Bank (2010) 
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differences in the age of international migrants, the average age of internal migrants is 
36.5 years, which is the oldest among migrants. The educational level of migrants (13 
years of schooling on average) is higher than that for non-migrants. The majority of 
international migrants tend to be men: 62.5% of migrants to Greece, 68.7% of migrants 
to Italy, and 59.0% of migrants to other countries. By contrast, only one-third (32.4%) 
of internal migrants are men. The age of the eldest son of international migrants is 
higher than that for non-migrants and internal migrants. Finally, no large differences 
between non-migrants and internal migrants are observed. 
There are differences in living status between internal and international migrants. 
Whereas more than half of international migrants live with their partners, fewer than 3% 
of internal migrants do so. The high proportion of women among internal migrants 
suggests that Albanian women do not migrate for marriage reasons, in contrast to Indian 
women (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989). Approximately 10% of migrants to Greece and 
Italy have a partner living in the parents’ household (PH) compared with fewer than 5% 
of internal migrants and migrants to other countries. These differences in living status 
between internal and international migrants might be accounted for by differences in the 
determinants of migration. As noted earlier, international migrants might be motivated 
not only for passage with family but also for alleviating financial difficulties in the 
home country (Azzarri and Carletto 2009). However, differences in remittance amount 
can be caused not only by a migrant’s motivations but also by the economic conditions 
of the final destination (e.g., labor market and exchange rate). 
2.3. Remittance probability and amount 
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Remittance probability and amount depends on income distribution3. Table 2 
indicates the probability of the migrant’s PH receiving remittance across income 
percentiles, showing there are no large differences. Indeed, the probability that poorer 
households receive remittance is only slightly higher than that for other households. By 
contrast, remittance amount differs across income percentiles. The poorest households 
receive the highest remittance amounts, which implies that relatively poorer households 
tend to obtain greater benefits from migrant remittance. 
2.4. Use of remittance 
Households in developing countries can have limited access to formal financial 
institutions, which means that many families might face liquidity constraints. Therefore, 
remittance is expected to improve the welfare of the PH. Further, if a household’s 
consumption level is above the subsistence level, remittance can allow investment. 
Previous studies have found that remittance and various types of household investments 
in developing countries are positively correlated. For example, Rozelle et al (1999) 
show that agricultural investment is positively correlated with remittance in rural areas 
of China. Similarly, entrepreneurship and small business investment have also been 
shown to be positively correlated in several countries (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002; 
Woodruff and Zentero 2007; Meanard 2004), while education investments are 
positively correlated with remittance in El Salvador and Guatemala (Edwards and Ureta 
2003; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010). Table 3 also reveals a similar trend in Albania. 
                                            
3 The presented sample consists of migrants who remit below 100,000 LEKS per month and 
migrants that do not remit to their PHs. This limitation aims to alleviate the effect of outliners on the 
calculation of average remittance amounts. The amount of 100,000 LEKS per month corresponds to 
the 95% percentile. 
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According to the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study for Albania 
(LSMS hereafter) (2003), remittance from international migrants is used not only for 
necessities, but also for investment into education, construction, and household 
businesses. Thus, remittance has the potential to improve long-term economic growth in 
Albania as well as smooth consumption. 
 
3. Motivations behind Remittance 
Four remittance motivations are considered in this study, namely altruistic, 
insurance, exchange, and inheritance motivation, based on the theoretical model 
proposed by Rapport and Docquier (2006). For all four of these motivations, I assume 
that there are two agents: one migrant and one PH. 
3.1. Altruistic motivation 
Here, I consider the case of unilateral altruism, where only migrants are altruistic. 
Under altruistic motivation, migrant utility is assumed to consist of two elements: own 
consumption and PH consumption. Therefore, altruistic migrants can gain from 
increasing not only their own consumption but also PH consumption. Migrants’ 
decision-making on remittance amount thus depends on PH consumption level and their 
altruism degree. When PH consumption level is low, which implies that the marginal 
utility gain of remittance is relatively high, migrants increase remittance amounts to 
maximize their own utility. By contrast, when PH consumption is high, migrants remit 
less. Further, migrants with a high altruism degree remit more, because relatively high 
altruistic migrants can receive higher marginal utility gain. In other words, altruistic 
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motivation predicts that remittance amount increases with migrant income and altruism 
degree, but decreases with PH income. However, since altruism degree and migrant 
income are not available in the data, PH income level and income determinants are used 
as determining factors for altruistic motivation. 
3.2. Exchange motivation 
Exchange motivation can take different forms. For example, when parents take 
care of a migrant’s children, the migrant might remit to the PH as a type of 
compensation. In such a case, remittance can be conceived as the purchase of services 
supplied by the parents. In addition, migrants might remit to the PH to repay the costs 
borne by parents before their migration (e.g., transaction costs and education fees).  
In contrast to altruistic motivation, exchange motivation postulates that migrant 
utility is composed of own consumption and parental services. When the marginal 
utility gain of services is positive for the migrant, it is negative for the PH because the 
parents have to cover the cost of the services. Therefore, if the PH utility gain from 
supplying the service is less than that derived from not supplying the service, no service 
is supplied (i.e., the entry constraint of the parents). An increase in PH income, which 
means a rise in the opportunity cost of parents, implies an increase in the service price 
and a subsequent increase in remittance amount (i.e., the entry constraint of the 
migrant). 
In the same vein, if the utility gain from receiving the service is less than that 
without the service, migrants do not buy the service. A rise in migrant income, which 
implies fewer budget constraints for the migrant, increases the purchase of the service if 
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the service is a normal good. To satisfy the entry constraint of the migrant and receive 
enough services from the parents, an increase in migrant income pushes up remittance 
amount. Therefore, under exchange motivation, an increase in migrant income also 
increases remittance amount. 
3.3. Insurance motivation 
People in developing countries, especially in rural areas, often face income 
volatility. For example, the weather affects agricultural production. When farmers face 
drought/flood, they cannot obtain any output, while their animals might catch an 
infectious disease. Therefore, farmers always face unpredicted and exogenous risk, 
which reduces income volatility. However, households face imperfect credit and risk 
markets, implying that it is difficult for people in rural areas to borrow money from the 
credit market when they face income shocks. Therefore, interfamilial arrangements or 
risk sharing within villages can be crucial for overcoming income volatility 
(Rosenzweig and Stark 1989). By contrast, although urban inhabitants do not face risks 
related to natural disasters, they can suffer income shocks, such as unemployment, 
ceremonial functions, and education expenses. In these cases, the income transfer from 
other people including family members that have migrated can overcome this lack of 
access to the credit market. 
Such strategic migration can be explained by the New Economic and Labor 
Migration theory (Stark and Bloom 1985). According to this theory, a migrant transfers 
income in the form of insurance when the PH faces income shocks. Indeed, it has been 
widely argued that remittance is an important factor for PH income in order to smooth 
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consumption (Lucus and Stark 1985). If migrants do not remit to parents when the PH 
faces income shocks, migrants are punished by their parents. However, migrants also 
receive an income transfer when they face income shocks, because the insurance 
motivation can be conceived as an informal contract between migrants and their parents. 
3.4. Inheritance motivation 
Under inheritance motivation, migrants remit to parents in order to receive 
inheritance, which is an enforcement device for migrants. Under this motivation, 
remittance can be conceived as a way to obtain an inheritance entitlement. Therefore, 
the expected inheritance amount and possibility of inheritance are determining factors. 
If the inheritance amount or possibility of inheritance rises, migrants remit more. 
3.5 Previous studies of the determinants of remittance 
Previous studies have demonstrated correlations that are consistent with specific 
remittance motivations. Cox et al. (1998) developed two types of theoretical models: 
altruistic and exchange. By using household survey data in Peru, they find that 
pre-transfer PH income is significantly positively correlated with remittance amount 
under exchange motivation but not under altruistic motivation. Other studies support 
these findings for exchange motivation, showing that migrants remit to repay debts that 
parents incurred for the migrant, such as education or migration costs (Poirine 1997; 
Ilahi and Jafarey 1999). 
de la Briere et al. (2002) focus on the insurance and investment motivations. 
Inheritance motivation is based on the age of the household head and parents’ 
inheritable assets, which both increase remittance amount. For insurance motivation, 
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they use the number of lost working days, which indicates an income shock faced by 
parents. Based on household data on a rural area in Dominica Sierra, they find that 
destination, sex, and household composition affect these motivations. Further, when a 
sole migrant is male, the migrant is motivated by insurance factors, whereas when 
destination of the migrant is the US, inheritance motivation plays a larger role in 
remittance. 
Other studies show evidence of both insurance and inheritance motivations. 
Hoddinott (1994) demonstrates that remittance probability and remittance amount 
increase with the amount of land held by parents in Kenya in line with the inheritance 
motivation theory. Lucus and Stark(1985) show that migrants remit to compensate for 
unexpected income drops (e.g., owing to drought) in Botswana (insurance motivation). 
 
4. Estimated model 
4.1. Econometric model 
As early works claimed that migrants are selected individuals, some selection 
mechanism of migrants may work (Stark and Lucus 1988; Hoddinott 1994). As 
explained in Section 2.2, the observable characteristics of migrants are different to those 
of non-migrants. For example, migrants are likely to be more educated, which implies 
that individuals who have relatively high expected incomes in the final destination are 
likely to migrate. Therefore, without controlling for this selection mechanism, the 
estimation of remittance determinants may be biased. To overcome this estimation 
problem, I apply the Heckman selection model in the present study. 
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In the first stage, I consider whether an individual migrates. Let migrate!∗ be a 
latent variable that increases in response to a rise in the propensity that individual i 
migrates. The propensity depends on not only the individual characteristics that affect 
the expected wage in the final destination, but also household characteristics. Therefore, 
the selection equation can be expressed as follows: 
(1)  𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!∗ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝑢! 
where 𝑋 is a vector of covariates in the first stage; 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients; and u! is an error term. It is assumed 𝐸(𝑢!) = 0 and it is distributed as a standard normal 
distribution. In the case that 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!∗ is higher than 0, individual i in household j 
migrates; otherwise, individual i does not, as follows: 
(2)  𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒! = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!∗ ≥ 00 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!∗ < 0   
I estimate equation (9) using a probit model: 𝑃 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!" = 1 𝑋 . Then, by 
using the estimated coefficients β, I predict the inverse Mills ratio 𝜆! = ! !!! !!  for each 
migrant, where Φ  is the cdf and ϕ is the normal pdf. Next, I estimate how much a 
migrant remits to the PH by using an OLS regression. The inverse Mills ratio also 
controls for the sample selection of migrants in the second stage:  
(3)  𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!" = 𝜉𝑍 + 𝜌𝜎!𝜆! + 𝜀! 
where Z is a vector of covariates in the second stage; 𝜌𝜎! is a covariate between 𝜀! 
and 𝑢!; and 𝜉 is a vector of parameters. Sample selection bias can be alleviated by 
applying the above method. 
4.2. Four remittance motivations 
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In the following subsections, I classify these motivations in detail. Table 4 then 
summarizes this classification according to the key variables. 
4.2.1. Altruistic motivation 
If altruism is a remittance motivation, remittance amount increases with migrant 
income. The reason for this rise is that a migrant receives utility gain not only from 
his/her own consumption but also from PH consumption, and therefore, the migrant 
chooses the optimal level of income transfer that maximizes his/her own utility level. 
However, inheritance and exchange motivations also predict the same effect of migrant 
income on remittance amount. Hence, to identify altruistic motivation, I assess how PH 
income level influences remittance amount. Since migrant utility increases with a rise in 
PH consumption under altruistic motivation, remittance amount might be the reason for 
that in contrast to the prediction made by the exchange model. 
4.2.2. Exchange motivation 
In this study, parental services (e.g., caring for the migrant’s family) and PH 
income level are used to test for exchange motivation. If the migrant remits under 
exchange motivation, he/she increases the remittance amount in order to pay for 
parental services. However, other motivations predict that parental services do not affect 
remittance amount. Additionally, the effect of PH income on remittance amount is 
positive if a pure exchange model is used in contrast to under altruistic motivation.  
4.2.3. Insurance motivation 
Under insurance motivation, migrants remit in the face of an income shock for 
the PH. However, it is difficult to distinguish insurance motivation from altruistic 
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motivation because altruistic migrants also increase remittance amount in the case that 
their parents face a fall in income. Therefore, I check whether migrant income affects 
remittance amount. If migrant income does not affect remittance amount, the remittance 
can be conceived as motivated by insurance reasons. 
4.2.4. Inheritance motivation 
Under this motivation, the probability of receiving inheritance, expected 
inheritance amount, and migrant income all increase remittance amount. However, 
because the effect of migrant income is the same as it is for the altruistic and exchange 
motivations, I use the probability of receiving inheritance and expected inheritance 
amount to identify inheritance motivation. 
4.3. Variables related to the four remittance motivations 
The available data do not allow me to analyze these motivations directly, 
because the key variables (e.g., migrant income and altruism degree) necessary to 
identify altruistic motivation are unavailable. Therefore, I test the motivations based on 
the implication of theories. In this subsection, I describe how to test these remittance 
motivations as well as the key variables that are expected to affect migrant remittance.  
4.3.1. Migrant income 
The altruistic, exchange, and inheritance motivations predict that migrant 
income in the final destination increases remittance amount. However, migrant income 
data are not available in LSMS 2005 for Albania. Therefore, in line with the approach 
taken by de la Briere et al. (2002), I use socio-demographic characteristics as income 
determinants (i.e., age, square of age, years of schooling, sex, and duration of 
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migration) instead of migrant income based on Mincer’s equation. 
These socio-demographic characteristics are important factors for migration. For 
example, individuals that have higher expected incomes in the final destination are more 
likely to migrate than individuals that have lower expected incomes. Hence, to consider 
the selection mechanism of migrants, it is necessary to control for socio-demographic 
variables in order to analyze migrant motivations in the first stage. 
4.3.2. PH income 
I use PH income level in order to identify the effect of pure altruistic motivation 
or pure exchange motivation on remittance amount. First, I estimate three percentiles of 
income per capita for the PH: 10th percentile, 25th percentile, and 50th percentile. I 
then define three dummy income variables: <10th percentile, 10th–25th percentile, and 
25th–50th percentile. The reference group is income above the 50th percentile. PH 
income level is a determinant of migration in developing countries, as low-income 
households cannot access the credit market sufficiently. To overcome this difficulty, 
people emigrate and remit from the final destination. It is thus necessary to control for 
PH income when analyzing migration behavior. 
4.3.3. Parental services 
Under exchange motivation, a migrant remits to the PH by way of compensation 
for parental services. To consider exchange motivation, I use a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the spouse of the migrant lives with the migrant’s parents as a proxy 
variable of parental services. 
4.3.4. Adverse short-run shocks faced by the PH 
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I use a variable that indicates whether the PH suffered the unexpected death of 
the income earner in 2003/2004 and in 2005 as a proxy variable for any adverse 
short-run shock faced by the PH. However, as described in Section 4.2, because it is 
difficult to distinguish pure insurance motivation from pure altruistic motivation, I 
check whether the determinants of migrant income affect remittance amount.  
4.3.5. Parents’ assets 
To test inheritance motivation, I use the number of rooms in the PH as a proxy 
variable for parents’ assets. Parents’ assets increase remittance amount if the migrant 
remits to parent owing to the inheritance motivation. As explained in Section 3.4, if 
parents hold considerable assets, which means that their inheritance is highly valued, 
then their children remit to receive bequests. If this is the case, migrants increase 
remittance amount in line with the inheritance value. 
4.3.6. Probability of receiving inheritance 
Under inheritance motivation, I include variables related to the probability of 
receiving an inheritance from parents. In this study, I use a dummy variable for the elder 
son, which indicates that the individual is more likely to receive an inheritance. In 
addition, age of the household head is included in the estimated equation; because the 
probability of death increases with age, the probability of receiving an inheritance rises 
with the age of the household head. 
4.4. Other variables 
4.4.1. Destination country dummy 
Wage in the final destination is determined by the characteristics of the migrant 
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as well as the local labor market. Additionally, migrants might decide on remittance 
amount by taking account of the relevant exchange rate. In these ways, destination 
influences remittance amount. To control for the heterogeneity of the destination, I add 
a destination dummy (Greece dummy, Italy dummy, and other countries dummy)4. The 
reference destination is internal migration. 
4.4.2. Characteristics of the household head 
The characteristics of the household head are expected to affect migrant 
remittance not only because the household head has more decision-making power in a 
household, but also because such characteristics affect the family’s economic situation. 
To control for these effects, socio-demographic variables (sex, years of schooling, and 
age) were included in the estimated equations.  
4.4.3. Household characteristics (household size, rate of labor force5, and rate of chronic 
illness6) 
If the household runs a self-owned business (including agriculture), an increase 
in the number of household members diminishes the marginal return on production 
labor. Therefore, allocating a family member to work in another business is optimal for 
households. In addition, household characteristics also affect the income source for the 
PH. To consider these effects, I control for the number of household members and the 
rate of labor as explanatory variables in the estimated equation. In addition, to control 
                                            
4 Other countries include other countries in Europe as well as the US. 
5 The rate of labor force is defined as the proportion of household members aged 15–65 years. 
6 The rate of chronic illness is defined as the proportion of family members who suffer from a 
chronic illness or disability that has lasted more than three months (including severe depression). 
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for the health conditions in the household, the rate of chronic illness is added as an 
explanatory variable.  
4.4.4. Community characteristics  
In the Heckman selection model, at least one variable that is excluded from the 
second equation is needed for identification. In this study, community characteristics are 
used as the excluded variables. In a community that displays significant migration, 
people can access information on the destination through the network of migrants. This 
migration network thus reduces the psychological and physical cost of migration for 
people in the community (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010; Moraga 2013). Further, in 
crime-ridden areas, people are expected to move to find a safer living environment. 
Hence, whether a community is crime-plagued also affects the migration decision. 
Excluded variables are required so that there is no correlation with the error term 
in the second equation. In the case of the excluded variables, however, migrant 
movement in the community is unlikely to affect remittance amount, because migrants 
decide this amount based on their relations with the PH not with the community. 
 
5. Data 
This study analyzes data derived from the LSMS 2005 for Albania. This survey 
was collected by the Institute of Statistics in May and early July with the technical 
assistance of the World Bank; the agricultural survey was undertaken in October. The 
purpose of the survey is to measure living conditions and poverty levels. 
These data consist of four elements: a household questionnaire, a diary for 
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recording household food consumption, a community questionnaire, and a price 
questionnaire. The household questionnaire includes information on the core LSMS 
models7 as well as additional modules on migration, fertility, subjective poverty, 
agriculture, non-farm enterprises, and social capital (World Bank 2006). In particular, 
the questionnaire asks households about children living away, socio-demographic 
characteristics, destinations, duration of migration, and remittance amounts. These data 
allow me to analyze remittance motivations by considering the characteristics of both 
children who migrate and their parents. In addition, the community questionnaire 
includes information on social order and migration in the community for analyzing the 
relationship between community characteristics and migration behavior.  
The sampling method of the LSMS 2005 for Albania is related to that used in 
the LSMS 2002 for Albania, namely a two-stage cluster sampling approach (World 
Bank 2006). First, 455 census enumeration areas (EAs) were collected78 based on area 
location (“Mountain area,” “Coastal area,” and “Central area”) and rate of development 
(“Urban area (big towns),” “Other Urban areas,” and “Rural areas”). The nation’s 
capital Tirana was considered to be a separate stratum. 
The second stage sample selection followed the 455 sample EAs selected in the 
first stage. The second stage samples were chosen based on a systematic sampling 
                                            
7 The core LSMS modules include the following information: metadata, household rosters, dwelling 
and utilities, education, health, employment, transfers and social assistance, other income sources, 
and consumption. 
8 The sample of 450 EAs in the 2005 LSMS is different to that in the 2002 LSMS (see World Bank 
2006). 
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method. In each EA, 12 households were initially selected. After selection, eight 
households were chosen as the base samples, while the remaining samples were the 
substitutes. The analysis of the study is based on individual units. The data include 
individuals that belong to the same household in order to control for not only individual 
characteristics but also head/family characteristics. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics, which include the mean and standard 
deviation of each variable. As discussed in Section 2.2, migrant characteristics are 
different to those of non-migrants. In terms of demographic characteristics, 46.3% of 
migrants are men compared with 50% for non-migrants. The average age of migrants 
(non-migrants) is 34.3 (32.0) years old and the average years of schooling is 11.0 and 
7.3 years, respectively. Altogether, 20.8% of migrants are the eldest son, which is 
higher than the rate for non-migrants, while 26.6% of migrants live with a partner, 
whereas 5.6% of the migrants’ partners live in the PH. Finally, 56.4% of migrants are 
internal, compared with 18.2% for Greece, 17.0% for Italy, and 8.4% for other 
countries. 
In regard to the head of the household, there are large differences between the 
migrant and non-migrant samples; the average age of the household head for the sample 
of migrants is 63.9 years, which is older than that for the sample of non-migrants (51.7 
years). Further, 83.1% (92.5%) of the heads in the sample of migrants (non-migrants) 
are men. Finally, the average years of schooling for migrants and non-migrants are 7.5 
and 9.8 years, respectively. 
Household size in the migrant sample is 8.1 persons per household, which is 
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larger than that for the sample of non-migrants (6.4 persons per household). The rate of 
labor force for migrants is 84.2%, which is larger compared with non-migrants, while 
the rate of chronic illness in the sample of non-migrants (85%) is considerably higher 
than that in the sample of migrants (51.4%). 
With respect to PH income level, there are also differences between both 
samples. The probability that poorer PHs have a child that migrates is relatively high. 
Regarding the adverse short-run shocks faced by PHs, the probability of the unexpected 
death of the income earner is similar for both samples, as is the community 
characteristics related to public order. However, the community characteristics 
regarding migration differ for both samples. 
 
6. Results 
As explained earlier, the Heckman selection model is used herein in order to 
control for sample selection bias. Therefore, migration determinants are estimated in the 
first stage of the model. Afterwards, using the information estimated in the first stage, 
this model estimates the determinants of remittance amount. In this section, I present the 
results from the first-stage and second-stage estimations.  
6.1. Migration determinants 
To control for the selection of migrants, the probability of migration is estimated 
in the first stage. Table 4 shows the mean marginal effect in the first stage estimated by 
the probit model. It is found that the probability of migrating is significantly affected by 
individual characteristics (age, square of age, male dummy, years of schooling, and 
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eldest son dummy) related to the wage in the final destination. In particular, the 
relationship between age and probability shows an inverted U-shape, demonstrating that 
32.6-year-olds are most likely to migrate. In other words, high-skilled individuals are 
more likely to migrate (see also Lanzona 1998). The female dummy variable increases 
the probability of migrating by 1.7% at the 1% significance level. As discussed in 
Section 2.2, the high rate of internal migration for women (67.6%) affects this result. 
Years of schooling also increase the probability by 0.4% at the 1% significance level. 
The characteristics of the head of household (age and years of schooling) are 
significant at the 1% level; while the probability increases with the age of the head, the 
age of the head decreases with the probability. This finding implies that family 
background may affect migration behavior (Lanzona 1998). In particular, elderly heads 
that have lower education are most likely to have at least one child that migrates. 
Moreover, except the rate of chronic illness, family characteristics (household 
size and rate of labor force) do not change the probability significantly. The rate of 
chronic illness decreases the probability of migration because when family members are 
needed to care for one another, they are less likely to migrate. In addition, the number of 
rooms does not affect the probability significantly; therefore, parents’ assets are not a 
determining factor for migration. 
All the dummy variables of PH income increase the probability significantly, 
implying that PH income level is an important determinant of migration. However, the 
probability of migrating does not change significantly with the income shocks faced by 
the PH. In fact, migration rarely occurs after an income shock. 
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The community characteristics related to migration increase the probability 
significantly. Since people can access information on the final destination easily, 
migration costs are lower than those in other communities, suggesting that the migrant 
network is an important factor (see Moraga 2013; McKenzie and Rapport 2010). 
However, public order in the community does not affect the probability significantly. 
6.2. Remittance motivations 
Table 6 presents the results of the second-stage estimation. The inverse Mills 
ratio positively increases the probability of migrating, which means that the selection 
mechanism of migrants is shown to be an important factor in determining remittance 
amount. In the following subsections, I discuss the four studied remittance motivations 
in detail.  
6.2.1. Altruistic motivation 
As discussed in Section 6.1, the characteristics of migrants (age, square of age, 
sex, years of schooling, and duration of migration) significantly affect remittance 
amount. Additionally, the dummy variables indicate that PH income level significantly 
affects remittance amount. This result implies that relatively poor households receive 
more remittance; however, the lowest-income households (i.e., below the 10th 
percentile of income) do not receive more remittance. These results are consistent with 
the prediction of altruistic motivation. Therefore, these findings declare that migrants 
from Albania are driven by altruistic motivation when remitting to their parents in 
contrast to the results of Cox et al. (1998), which show an inverse relationship between 
pre-transfer income and transfer amounts received. 
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6.2.2. Exchange motivation 
The dummy variable for whether the partner of the migrant lives in the PH 
significantly increases remittance amount. When the partner of the migrant lives in the 
PH, the migrant’s parents take care of the partner as a service, thereby increasing 
remittance amount (i.e., exchange motivation). By contrast, remittance amount 
decreases significantly when the partner lives with the migrant. In that case, the migrant 
does not need to remit as a form of compensation of the service. Moreover, since 
migrants have to care for their partners, a proportion of their incomes in the final 
destination is used for that. 
6.2.3. Insurance motivation 
The unexpected death of the income earner in the PH in 2005 significantly 
increases remittance amount. This finding implies that migrants remit to compensate for 
the lack of income caused by this sudden death. However, migrants significantly 
decrease remittance amount when the PH suffer the unexpected death of the income 
earner in 2003/2004. This finding implies that the unexpected death in 2003/2004 
lowers the expenditure necessary for living in the PH. 
As described in Section 2.4, if a migrant is driven to remit by the insurance 
motivation, his/her income does not increase remittance amount. As explained above, 
income determinants affect remittance amount. Hence, remittance can be driven by 
altruistic motivation but not by insurance motivation. 
6.2.4. Inheritance motivation 
The eldest son dummy increases remittance amount by 32% at the 5% 
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significance level, lending support to the probability of receiving inheritance increasing 
remittance amount. However, the age of household head decreases this amount by 2.8% 
at the 1% significance level. This result might be caused by the other elements that 
fluctuate with the age of the household head (e.g., family background). The number of 
rooms in the PH increases remittance amount by 10.4% at the 1% significance level, 
implying that inheritance value increases remittance amount (i.e., inheritance 
motivation). This finding is consistent with those of previous studies (see Stark and 
Lucus 1988). 
6.3 Other findings 
As expected, the country-specific dummy variables increase remittance amount 
at the 1% significance level, which suggests that international migrants remit more in 
comparison with internal migrants. Thus, remittance amount is affected by the 
conditions in the final destination (e.g., labor market and currency exchange) as well as 
differences in migration motivations (de la Briere et al. 2002). Therefore, the destination 
is an influencing factor of remittance amount. 
Similarly, the age and years of schooling of the household head decrease 
remittance amount by 3.4% at the 1% significance level, while the rate of labor in the 
PH also decreases this amount significantly. Since Albanian migrants are driven to 
remit by altruistic motivation, they lower remittance amount when PH income level is 
high. Since the rate of labor increases with PH income, migrants remit less (i.e., 
altruistic motivation). However, the rate of chronic illness significantly decreases 
remittance amount.  
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7. Conclusion 
In Albania, remittance has been increasing since the collapse of the communist 
regime in the early 1990s and has become an important factor for the country’s 
economic growth. In this paper, I investigated remittance motivations by applying the 
Heckman selection model to assess migration behavior. The presented analysis is based 
on data derived from the World Bank’s LSMS 2005 for Albania. 
I considered four remittance motivations: altruistic, exchange, insurance, and 
inheritance motivations. To identify the effect of pure altruistic and pure exchange 
motivation, I assessed the effect of the Parent’s Household income level on remittance 
and found that poorer households receive more remittance, in line with the theory of 
altruistic motivation. However, since parental services increase remittance amount, 
exchange motivation also drives remittance behavior in Albania. In addition, both the 
probability of receiving inheritance and inheritance value increase remittance amount, 
which concurs with inheritance motivation. Since not only income shocks but also other 
factors affect remittance amount, altruistic motivation rather than insurance motivation 
is an appropriate explanation for remittance behavior in this regard. These results 
suggest that migrants in Albania are driven to remit owing to a combination of altruistic, 
exchange, and inheritance motivations. Further, migration destination influences 
remittance amount, which implies that not only the local labor market and currency rate 
at the final destination but also migration motivation factors affect remittance amount. 
In the estimation of migration behavior, I find that individuals that expect to 
receive higher wages in their final destinations are prone to migrate. The characteristics 
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of the household head also affect this behavior. This finding implies that the decision to 
migrate is made not only by the individual but also by the Parent’s household. In 
particular, if a family member suffers from a chronic illness, the individual in question 
would not migrate. 
In terms of policy implications from the study, the results suggest that Albanian 
migrants remit owing to a combination of altruistic, exchange, and inheritance 
motivations. In poor credit market environments characterized by financial constraints, 
remittance allows the Parent’s household to smooth consumption. For example, when a 
family faces an income shock, it may not be necessary to lower consumption level if the 
family receives migrant remittance. In addition, remittance is also used for investment 
into business activities as well as education in Albania. To summarize, remittance 
contributes to economic activity in Albania, and thus, the Albanian government should 
continue to implement policies that stimulate the flow of international migration and 
encourage migrant remittance. 
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Definition: Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or  
                   received by resident households  
Figure 1. Flow of remittance from abroad 
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Urban Area  Rural Area
puchase of food and basic necessities 78% 77%
investment in construction /purchase a durable good 23% 37%
eductaional expenses/ child Support 10% 7%
investment in HH enterprise 4% 10%
other 40% 32%
Table 3. Usage of remittance
Note: Definition of remittance: Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in
kind made or received by resident households
Variable Altrusim Exchange Insurance Inheritance
Income of migrant ＋ + ＋
Income level of parent ー +
Service that parent supplies ＋
Adverse short-run shock that parent faces
in parent's income ＋ ＋
Asset  that parent owns ＋
Probability of receiving inheritance ＋
Table 4. Classification of variables
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mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev.
 How much did a emigrate remit? (log) 1.6595 3.0749
 Characteristics of individual
 age 32.4658 19.2195 34.2534 9.3928 31.9912 21.0469
 squared of age/100 14.2340 14.8867 12.6150 6.9263 14.6638 16.3352
    years of schooling 8.0907 5.2375 10.9238 3.9887 7.3385 5.2721
    male 0.4934 0.5000 0.4634 0.4987 0.5013 0.5000
    eldest son 0.1469 0.3540 0.2072 0.4053 0.1309 0.3373
    duration of migration 10.7473 7.9974
 whether  partner lives with migrant 0.2627 0.4401
 whether partner lives with home family 0.0557 0.2294
 Destination(comparison group: internal migration)
 whether member emigrates to Italy 0.1817 0.3857
 whether member emigrates to Greece 0.1696 0.3753
 whether member emigrates to other countries 0.0843 0.2779
 Characteristics of Head
   age 53.8424 13.5387 63.9100 10.6514 51.1695 12.9535
   male 0.9049 0.2934 0.8307 0.3751 0.9246 0.2641
    years of schooling 9.3422 4.9616 7.5139 5.1494 9.8276 4.7950
 Characteristics of Household 
    size of household 6.7512 2.7155 8.1488 2.8452 6.3802 2.5547
 rate of labor force 0.7395 0.2089 0.8419 0.1403 0.7123 0.2156
   rate of chronic illness 0.7845 0.2392 0.5181 0.1917 0.8553 0.1970
 numbers of rooms 2.5076 1.1047 2.5601 1.0250 2.4936 1.1245
 Income shock
   unexpected death of income earner in 2003 or 2004 0.0099 0.0992 0.0071 0.0842 0.0107 0.1028
   unexpected death of income earner in 2005 0.0028 0.0528 0.0024 0.0487 0.0029 0.0539
 Income per capita
   income<10 percentile 0.0951 0.2933 0.1558 0.3627 0.0790 0.2697
   10 percentile<income<25 percentile 0.1304 0.3368 0.2070 0.4052 0.1101 0.3130
   25 percentile<income<50 percentile 0.2617 0.4396 0.3189 0.4661 0.2465 0.4310
 Characteristics of Community
   whether there are any problem related to gangs 0.0292 0.1684 0.0288 0.1673 0.0293 0.1688
   whether people leave the community
   temporarily a lot/ occasionally
0.7745 0.4179 0.7816 0.4132 0.7726 0.4192
 Sample Size 20015 4199 15816
Source: Author’s calculations from the LSMS 2005 for Albania.
Samples of migrant Samples of non-migrant
 Table 5. Relationship between the Parent’s Household income and remittance amount           
All housheold
